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Abstract
Antinomy basically as an inherent structural tension from within the reason between 
rational willing toward the unconditioned and rational thinking necessarily conditioned 
by the rule of understanding plays a negative role in and for Kant’s system to critically 
compass reason in limiting itself within the possibility of real experience. In Husserl, 
under the banner of one all-encompassing reason, antinomy takes a modified form 
of an ontological incommensurability between two essentially separable regions of 
being, i.e., between the ideal and the real; such ontological antinomy now takes up the 
place of an apriori condition for the possibility of meaning for Husserl. Representing a 
peculiar hierarchical ontological relation through which a lawful power flows, Husserlian 
antinomy plays an essentially affirmative-political function. In this paper, I will analyze 
the constructive antinomic structure of phenomenological being relation in contrast to 
Kantian restrictive antinomy and discuss its political implication.  
1．Introduction
Antinomy as a metaphysically specified concept was first introduced by Kant in order 
to describe the frustration between rational will guided by the laws of freedom, which 
ever tends to progress forward the unconditioned and rational capacity at the same time 
limited by the laws of understanding, which has to back off with a series of conditions.1 
A key point in Kantian antinomy is that antinomy is not something irrational; the 
antinomic pairs —the unconditioned and conditions— are both grounded precisely on the 
essence of reason as such. It is reason as such which brings about, calls for an antinomy. 
Kantian antinomy is thereof immediately hooked up with a limit-character of critical 
reason, to and for which reason can do nothing but trying not to transgress the mutual 
limiting of rational willing and rational knowing.
In sharp contrast, in Husserl, under the transcendental jurisdiction of one all-
encompassing reason, ‘I will’ and ‘I think’ merge, not only theoretically but also 
＊ The main idea of this work comes originally from the introductiory part and the first chapter of my 
dissertation. With additional reflections and readings, necessary revisions and changes of the content and 
structure, it has been recreated into this form of an independent paper.
1  A406-420/B432-448. For all references for Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, I follow the standard A/B 
pagination..
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normatively. In this context, Kantian antinomy has become a challenge for Husserlian 
reason to resolve, as long as it perplexes reason and tends to crack its unity. In Husserl 
the role and position of antinomy is shifted from an irremovable epistemological 
problematic to a primordial ontological condition for the possibility of knowledge at all. 
It comes to represent a peculiarly phenomenological relation between the two most 
fundamentally and primordially differentiated types of being, namely, between the real 
and the ideal. 
The antinomic relation of being now functions as the condition for the possibility of 
phenomenology as such, regulating the whole system of Husserl’s phenomenological 
critique of reason. This paper will carry out a theoretical formulation of such Husserlian 
antinomy laid out on the metaphysical level already at the birth of phenomenology and 
consistently operative thereafter. Based on that, it will look into a definite political phase 
qualifying the antinomic structure of the phenomenological being.     
2．On the Road to Overcoming Kantian Dichotomy 
1）Idea for critique: Kant
For Kant, science is a system of rational knowledge which is guided by the idea of 
a systematic whole derived from the “universal interest” of reason called architectonic 
interest. (A832/B860) Scientificity for Kant, represented by systematic division, is first 
and foremost a natural facticity of reason; it comes from the fact of reason that reason 
itself is a system and the end of reason that it thereby always already drives toward 
a system.2 Systematic unity of science signifies a rule-followed structural harmony 
amongst all its parts and justification of science should be justification of the operation 
of those prescriptive rules and principles for the making of objectivity. As a ‘natural’ 
manifestation of rationality as the systematic division under the architectonic plan, 
knowledge itself is thus always already dualistic for Kant ; it has two radically separated 
origins, namely, sensibility and understanding, about the reason for the separation of 
which human reason has no position to tell anything at all.(A15/B29) In this natural 
morphology of knowledge, the first Kantian task is to discern out the possibility for 
objects to be given through the former and the possibility for them to be thought 
through the latter; based upon those conditions, what is at final issue is to explain how 
intuition and thought are to be combined to yield to a unity which makes universal 
and necessary knowledge, namely, science, possible. Kant’s transcendental logic is thus 
a logic of the justification of the architectonic system of all sciences, validated on the 
transcendental deduction, of which the conclusive message could be that, with the logic 
justified through such procedure in such fashion, no principles are to be incoherent in 
terms of their application to each field of science, delimiting the sphere of object and the 
scope of capacity, in order to maintain the metaphysical harmony and security of the 
structure. Such would be the main point of transcendental philosophy as the mere idea 
2  About the systematicity as an end and an interest of reason, see the “Prefaces” to First & Second Edition, 
(Kant(1965), 7-37) together with “The Transcendental Doctrine of Method,” (A832-856/B860-884)
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of science.(A13/B27) 
In this overall Kantian context, the role of idea is quite “negative” precisely with 
regard to the goal of the ultimate justification of the apriori conditions for the possibility 
of scientific knowledge, which is no other than “critique” as such.(A11/B25) For Kant, the 
science of reason, basically as a system of philosophical knowledge about the principles 
of understanding obtained only through a mediated deductive procedure can in no way 
claim the same level of immediate apodictic certainty that mathematical knowledge 
claims; it can at best claim absolute necessity.3 Being absolutely necessary, but not 
necessarily absolutely certain, philosophical knowledge as such is not experiencible in 
intuition. Theory reaches apodictic certainty never with philosophy thereof ; reason only 
speculates it. The tendency of reason to speculate absolute epistemological certainty 
with philosophy is to be the source of a dogmatic risk which could divert the course of 
rationality from the track of the critical motif not to extend beyond the certainty that it 
can claim; scientificity always in conjunction with criticality in Kant is something which 
is operative always on some agnostic limit naturally incurred on reason concerning the 
possibility to have apodictic truth in the domain of transcendental philosophy. 
Therefore, the transcendental idea of totality of all the conditions for any given objects 
to be conditioned, while being necessary as it is imposed by the nature of reason itself 
and as a guiding principle of architectonic system, could be yet itself something always 
illusive; insofar as the speculative reason cannot prove it with apodictic certainty, a 
certain metaphysical danger is always laden in the philosophical Idea, which always 
spares a room for a speculation. That is why idea plays its role in the “Dialectic” part 
in the Critique of Pure Reason, more or less as a latent source of the transcendental 
illusion in Kant, as the locus of antinomy, where analytic intellect and dialectic passion of 
the same reason dualistically clash, of necessity.
2）Critique for Idea : Husserl
With Husserl such story goes through a significant change. Starting out by directly 
taking over Kant’s questions as to ‘how an object is to be known and how a priori 
synthetic knowledge is possible’ along with Kant’s incipient motif to provide a 
secure path to science, Husserl yet discriminates himself from Kant in terms of the 
appropriation of the idea of science and the meaning of the very idea as such. For 
Husserl, Idea, firmly preserving Platonic sense of archetype and paradigm, serves the 
most reliable source for apodictic certainty. Not just necessity, but also certainty is to 
be guaranteed precisely on the ground of Idea. What is of essential importance with 
Idea is its entirely de-empiricized purity, which apparently consists of the very basic 
presupposition of and for phenomenology: There is an ideal spot, which can be called 
the meaning essence or core, in any theoretical semantic structure, the truth validity of 
which is, in principle, completely outside of empirical reality in toto.
3  A712-738/B740-766
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Unlike Kant, with Husserl, that Idea is not to be given in any form of empirical reality 
ranks the Idea at the top in the hierarchy of truth criteria. The independence from 
every empirical condition is an uncompromisable merit rather than a reason for the call 
for caution, being the source of “timeless validity” of the claims of logic. Timelessness 
here represents validity that runs “beyond time”(Husserl 2001a, 85); the validity of ideal 
objects, of the law of gravitation and the law of contradiction, e.g., takes its ground from 
“their own semantic content” so that it holds “even if there were no mental processes 
at all,” even if “all gravitational masses were eliminated” (ibid, 97); logical truth is truth 
of such kind.
Hence, Idea is never a “mere” something for Husserl; it is always already the most 
actual being as such and necessarily refers to an object as such to be directly given. 
There are two moments of ideality in Husserl: ideality as an ideal object such as objects 
of geometry and mathematics or pure logical forms, and ideality as essential attribute of 
Idea. Both share the key conceptual element of ideality that its truth-function is derived 
from its own inner semantically self-justifiable rationality irrelevant to any circumstantial 
condition to which it is realistically bound.
Therefore, Kantian possibility of speculation inherently related to certain degree 
of necessary uncertainty is completely missing in Husserlian picture of the theory of 
knowledge from the outset. Idea per se, despite its necessary transcendental function 
over experience, stands as an impediment for theoretical certainty in Kant, because it 
is not an object of possible experience; it is a necessary vice implicit in the course of 
the justification of science, which leads reason to an insecure yearning for the apodictic 
certainty of transcendent truth. To the contrary, it is an original good explicit for 
Husserl, which guarantees inner apodictic security for scientific truth: idea is not a 
limiting turning-point but a referential beginning- and teleological end-point in Husserl; 
Idea is experienciable as a direct indication of self-evidence (ibid, 85), far from being 
merely regulatively operative in the background of the employment of the rules of 
understanding. 
Likewise, the systematicity of science no longer refers to a thorough observance of 
the division rule of understanding followed by a structural stasis of tensional balance and 
organic coherence, but represents a unifying comportment of reason as such. The act 
character of reason is an embodied part of the idea of science as such (Husserl, 2001a, 
18). In this context, foundation, one of the most fundamental concepts of phenomenology, 
is now the new name for scientificity. With Husserl, the ultimate validation of science 
is not to end at a non-contradicted structural delimitation of the boundaries of cognitive 
faculty, but a hierarchical extension and expansion of the original justifying power of 
reason on the theoretical horizon; scientificity finds its strongest momentum precisely in 
reason’s validating act as such as an affirmation of the direct presence and engagement 
of Idea as the ultimate evidence for objectivity. 
Now the certainty-founding capacity of reason grounded upon the primordial certainty 
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of ideality belongs to the meaning core of the Idea of science in Husserl. Knowledge is 
possible thanks to the absolute a priori being of the ideal content such as the a priori 
“laws, grounds, principles” of logic, which retains “inwardly evident truths” standing 
absolutely valid, whether or not a rational noetic act is actually in play. That constitutes 
precisely the semantic essence of a theory. In other words, what is responsible for the 
validation of theoretical truth is the Idea of Theory as such; theory is something that 
internalizes the ideal truth components into its own meaning by the very meaning of 
its own.4 Thus with Husserl, unlike Kant, theory in which philosophy itself must be 
included is integrated into a unitary realm of an intuitive experience of ideal truth. The 
ideal essences of the laws and concepts responsible for a deduction are always already 
susceptible to an “a priori insight” as that which makes the very deductive linkage itself 
is possible. 
3．Founding-Founded Relational Hierarchy as the Condition for the Validation of Truth   
1）Validation of truth as an instituting of relation: Categorial Intuition[Kategoriale 
Anschauungen]
From the very beginning, Husserl lays out a meaning of truth particularly implying a 
definite relationality.5 Truth concerns the “ideal relationship among the epistemic essences 
of the coinciding acts,” obtained in the “unity of coincidence” called “self-evidence” on 
the one hand, and refers to the “rightness” of intention, on the other, that is, the “rightness 
of the judgment in the logical sense of the proposition,” which means a ‘right’ for an ideal 
speech to say: ‘the proposition is really what it says in the judgment.’ (Husserl 2001b, 
264) 
Such conceptualization of truth pins down the “ideal adequation of a relational act to 
the corresponding adequate percept of a state of affairs.”(ibid, 266) Here by adequation 
means Husserl a fulfillment of meaning intention with intuition; the experience of 
agreement between the meant and the given indicates self-evidence. The self-evident 
truth as an identification of the intended with the intuited is correlative to an act in 
and by way of which certain definite epistemological relation is instituted amongst the 
epistemic elements involved in the truth-claim. With Husserl, intuition, beyond the sense 
of an act of perception as a simple seeing, gains such peculiarly phenomenological sense 
of an act of confirming the being of Idea, which inaugurates certain power relation 
between the Idea and the meaning of the perceived. 
Let us now delve into the structure of that relation. Husserl divides elements of logical 
judgments into what can be fulfilled adequately in perception and what cannot. Proper names 
expressible in logical variables, such as P, S, X, etc., can be fulfilled adequately in perception. 
The remaining parts of the expression, however, namely, the formal parts such as ‘a’, ‘the’, ‘all’, 
‘many’, ‘is’, ‘not’, and so forth, cannot. The question now is: “Are there parts and forms 
of perception corresponding to all parts and forms of meaning?”(ibid, 272) 
4  Husserl( 2001a), 149-152
5  Husserl(2001b), 263-267
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For example, in the thing white paper, that is, paper which is white, the ‘is’ and the 
concept of whiteness as such are never to be seen adequately with the perception 
of this paper per se present in front of me as a real object; the knowledge of white 
paper is obtained through a fulfillment of whiteness as such, as the object meant; in 
order to apprehend the perceived thing, the whiteness as such as an ideal object, as 
a color-idea, must be intuited together with the perception of this white paper here. 
But the seeing of whiteness requires an act of a completely different kind. It is seen 
only with a simultaneous enactment of the consciousness of the ‘is’ and thus always 
in the awareness of the whole state of affairs in the form of “being-white.” This is an 
intuition which is founded upon the same percept and yet has a distinct object of its own 
such as ‘being’ ; the perceived thing per se ‘serves only as an elucidatory example’, a 
‘documented case’ of the universality of the ideal object.6
All those which cannot be wrapped up with individual particular percepts, those 
which cannot be made into specific variables as objective “stuff” to be perceived—calls 
Husserl “categorial forms.” None of those categorial forms, none of the ‘a’, ‘the’, ‘and’, 
‘or’, ‘if’, and the propositional elements of quantity, modality, number are in the object 
sensuously perceived, for they all lack being of reality with their meaning essences 
completely nonempirical.
Without changing the meaning and function of intuition, one should be able to say 
now about a non-sensuous perception; Husserl calls it “categorial intuition.” Categorial 
intuition is an intuition having universal idealities as its objects of perception, i.e. non-
sensory ideal concepts and forms such as aggregate, infinity, totalities, pluralities, 
numbers, state of affairs etc. They are just as objects as objects of sensible intuition 
insofar as they satisfy the conditions of intuitive objectivity, i.e. givenness and presence. 
Categorial intuition, a rather ‘rebellious’ notion against Kant’s dualistic rationality, now 
becomes not only possible, but necessary with Husserl. While in Kant categories or 
concepts are apriori conditions for the knowledge of an object of possible experience 
but nowise themselves to be possibly experienced. In Husserl, however, category itself 
is to be an object to be directly given in intuition; it is possible to be experienced. Given 
that fulfillment means making present in person, categorial intuition makes universality 
per se present. Through the categorial intuition, ideal object, pure idea as such, is to be 
directly grasped in its full universality at one time. 
2）The founding-founded, inseparably-separated relational dialectic
The name for the new epistemological relation working for the categorial intuition 
is a founding-founded relation which represents the phenomenological way in which 
the I-think reaches the objectivity of the world.7 The categorial intuition is a “founded 
6  Husserl(2001b), §41
7  In Husserlian context, the founding-founded relation fundamentally characterizes the structure of part-whole 
relation. With the notion of foundation, Husserl translates part-whole relation into the relation of non-identical 
mutual dependency. For the phenomenological reestablishment of Part-Whole relationship, see particularly 
Husserl(2001b), Investigations III & IV.
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act” on an actual perceptual intuition. Nonetheless, it is simultaneously capable of an a 
priori independent epistemological performance of direct and immediate apprehension 
of the ideal meaning of logical forms and concepts. In this regard, the founding-founded 
complexity involved in the categorical intuition represents a kind of dialectical relation 
between non-independence and independence, between separability and inseparability; 
‘dialectical’ first and foremost in a quite primitive Platonic sense of ‘divisionary within 
and for a unifying synthesis’, which embeds a concept of relational hierarchy in it, and 
also in a Hegelian sense that an affirmation of independence and separability essentially 
contains within itself a moment of self-negation, namely, dependence and inseparability. 
But a peculiar phenomenon of this phenomenological dialectic is that the two ‘opposites’ 
in no way conflict with each other: in this sense, it is farthest from both Hegelian and 
Kantian dialectic. What should be clearly seen is that, strictly divided, those opposites 
are always already monadically unified, i.e. indivisibly, non-contradictingly. 
However, Husserlian monad does not unilaterally correspond to a Leibnizian 
ontological substance, either, even though sharing with it some essential attributes 
such as indivisibility and unity. One thus should be careful when saying that in Husserl 
reason is monadic, as opposed to Kant8; reason is fundamentally monadic with Husserl, 
not necessarily in regard to the simplicity of reason as substance, but rather in terms 
of its function of monadizing—unifying—Idea with experience. The famous Husserlian 
expression from the beginning, “One All-encompassing reason,” speaks precisely for 
such monadic tendency of cognitive motion, which in itself counteracts to the limited and 
divided Kantian intellect. What is monadic in the end is the relation as such. Idea and 
experience, theory and givenness are not to be contradicting in terms of the possibility 
of knowing as in Kant, but essentially inseparable, mutually dependent, in Husserl. 
In sum, the objectivity of the categorial forms as such can never be separately 
perceived without intimation with a real founding intuition; yet they ‘exist’ as absolutely 
independent actualities at the same time in order to make the real known. The categorial 
intuition, i.e, the eidetic seeing, releases the categorical forms themselves independently 
and thereby grants the experience of the real a price of legitimate knowledge. In this 
way, a definite hierarchy in terms of the epistemic power is set up between a real 
particular case and an ideal universal prototype, between two generically differentiated 
perceptive acts. 
4. Husserlian Antinomy as the Principle of Ontological Placement of Being
1）The ontological differentiation between the ideal and the real
The meaning and role of non-independence is never simply the same as 
dependence, never implies a low-positionality. Non-independence, namely, foundedness, 
phenomenologically understood, rather has an intent of a higher ideal necessity, which 
deserves a definitely ‘separate’ place with regard to its meaning value. Likewise, the 
8  See Husserl(1980), §14 : “Inclusion of the Ontologies in Phenomenology.”
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independence of the founding real percept does not mean a validatory self-sufficiency 
of self-evidence; rather the non-independence of the founded consciousness of the ideal 
object represents self-sufficiency in terms of its presentifiability.
In this qualitative-functionally intertwined relational complex between founding 
dependence and founded self-sufficiency lies a logical ‘perplexity’ where the hierarchy 
as a measure of epistemological potential operates in such a peculiar direction from 
the founded to the founding, so that what is prior logico-literally, namely, the founding 
element, comes to be what is dependent phenomenologico-dialectically; as a result, the 
founded element takes up the prior in terms of the validating power position. This 
‘oddity’ is to go away only with an inversion of the relational order by the insertion of 
an ontological hierarchy.
We do not deny but in fact emphasize, that there is a fundamental categorical split between ideal 
being and real being; between being as Species and being as what is individual. The conceptual 
unity of predication likewise splits into two essentially different sub-species according as we affirm 
and deny properties of individuals, or affirm or deny general determination of Species. (Husserl 
2001a, 150, emphases added)
The most rigorous split is now structurally premade strictly with regard to being 
in Husserl between the real and the ideal. The real and the ideal are the two most 
tenacious and most fundamental categories of phenomenological being surviving all 
modifications and extension throughout Husserl’s phenomenology as a whole. The 
ontological differentiation of the ideal being from the real being is essential, not only as 
a metaphysical condition for the experience of truth, but for phenomenological thinking 
at all: “one must clearly grasp what the ideal is, both intrinsically and in relation to 
the real, how this idea stands to the real, how it can be immanent in it and so come to 
knowledge.”(Husserl 2001a, 120) The ideal, for Husserl, both as the innate quality of Idea 
and itself as a form of object as such to be intuited, is most conspicuously characterized 
with its complete independence from the conditions that determine the totality of the 
real. Correlatively, the real represents something consisting of the totality of nature, 
which stands up ‘against’ the ideal in regard to its objective essences. The being of the 
real is to be determined exactly with reference and in essential relation to the way in 
which the ideal exists. By the same token, what the ideal is intrinsically, is revealed and 
affirmed with and through the determination of what the real is. They are going to be 
‘ontologico-categorically’ differentiated from each other in the essentially constitutive 
relation.
2）Antinomy as an Ontological Incommensurability
In this way, already at the most primitive stage of phenomenology, ideality 
fundamentally as a meaning property denotes a property of being: Idea is a being as that 
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which “remains in itself” and “retains its ideal being.”(Husserl 2001a, 86) It is something 
that is ‘there’ as a pure “ideal possibility” as “the being or holding” of universality, that 
is, as a “possibility in regard to the being of empirical cases.”(ibid) What that being 
of ideality specifically refers to is being qua being, not a being derived or constituted, 
i.e., being whose existential meaning ground comes from the being of itself, namely, 
being given in itself. It denotes being of the most evident actuality in the sense of self-
sufficiency, i.e., that which “appears as actual and self-given.”(Husserl 2001a, 282, bolds 
added)
In contrast to the self-givenness of ideal being, the being of the real world is given 
in the form of the “general positing [Setzung]”(Husserl 1983, 57) in the attitude that 
characterizes the reflective style of positive natural sciences. The “natural attitude,” 
so names Husserl, asserts the true existence of the real world always in the mode 
of a thesis and thereby inheres, that is, essentially, a tendency to frame any ‘thingly’ 
experience within formal predication. For Husserl, such being of reality merely 
represents a posited givenness, which means nothing other than that it is “predicative-
thematically formed.” If being and remaining in this natural attitude, experience present 
to my consciousness is always already thematic; it is already a product of thought. The 
totality of the real as the being of the positedly given is not existence as such subject to 
an “original immediate experience,” but rather existence as always already registered 
within a predicative form.
Likewise, there are two types of certainties which concern fundamentally different 
“kinds of being,”9 namely, the certainty of the being of the real and the certainty of the 
being of the irreal[reell]-ideal; the former certainty, i.e., the certainty of the existence of 
the world, indicates a thematically registered sense grasped as being certain, while the 
latter absolute evidence as that which justifies that very registration. Each different type 
concretely corresponds to the region of physis and the region of pure noesis, respectively. 
Such contrast of the two certainties and regions now refers to an ontological barrier 
set up between the real and the ideal-irreal; it represents an “abysmal distance” that is 
supposed to be passed through during the epochē. However, what has become more and 
more clear and significant is precisely the distance itself between this world immersed in 
the natural attitude and that world of pure consciousness taken off from that attitude. 
With that installation of the barrier, however, the two domains are to be immediately 
and essentially related precisely in that disconnection, as that disconnection. All this 
happened on different levels. The former—disconnection—institutes an ontological 
relation and the latter—interconnection—announces an epistemological relation, as had 
been altogether clearly manifest already in the Logical Investigations with the notion 
9  The differentiation of being into the being of the real and the being of the ideal makes Husserl launch the 
program of “regional ontology” which is interested in a discernment of ontological essences of different species 
of objects in terms of a strict distinction of the regions to which they must belong. Hence the clarification 
of distinct regions of being directly and essentially corresponds to a distinction of the “kinds of being,” the 
expression of which Ludwig Landgrebe used in his article “Regions of Beings and Regional Ontologies in 
Husserl’s Phenomenology” (Landgrebe (1981), 135).
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of the categorial intuition. The monadic epistemological integration of the play of the 
ideal into the whole of the act of understanding is precisely conditioned upon such 
most strictly dualistic ontological disintegration of the essence of the ideal-irreal being 
from that of the real being. The categorial intuition itself was already a form of such 
act of setting up an ontological barricade between the two dwelling places to which the 
corresponding objects belong. 
That bar signifies nothing else than an ontological incommensurability in the sense 
that it cannot be broken into by those conditions that determine the being of the real. 
Precisely upon such ontological incommensurability, the founded character of categorical 
objectivity can turn to be itself founding. Precisely in such ontological irreconcilability 
lies Husserlian ‘antidote’ to the Kantian antinomy that was phenomenologically criticized 
as having been originated from a metaphysical confusion about the regional essences of 
different “classes” of being.
3）Transcendence and Immanence
Transcendence and immanence designating two fundamentally different modes of 
givenness of objects in their relation to pure consciousness, are introduced  precisely 
in this theorizing context of the mutually incommensurable ontological relation 
between the region of the real and the region of the irreal-ideal.10 Husserl describes a 
transcendent object as an object that presents itself to consciousness only in the mode 
of “adumbration.”(Husserl 1983, 87) It shows itself, whether actually in person, or in 
memory, or in phantasy or in imagination, in whatever modified forms of cognition, in a 
constantly flowing chain of consciousness of lived experiences, only as an ever-changing 
part or side or moment, that is, “of essential necessity.”(ibid) It never gives itself a 
whole including every component of its being all at once in one consciousness. This is 
the mode of givenness of the whole of physical being; the essential modal characteristic 
of this being, that is, the being of a physical thing, is “inadequacy” and “contingency,” 
for it could be given otherwise on the horizon of lived experience. For Husserl the 
contingency of physical being means, as it is, the contingency of the very posited thesis 
of the world’s spatiotemporal-causally bound existence. As said, the existence of the 
world is nothing but the contingent sense of that thesis: “beyond that it is nothing.”(Husserl 
1983, 112, original italics) From that, the existential necessity of reality has gone. 
As opposed to the one-sided, adumbrative givenness of the transcendent object, 
an immanent object is given in an “absolute” mode, keeping all the connotations of 
the infinite, the total and the whole within its meaning, though with its own peculiar 
kind of inadequacy.11 The immanent object is present within consciousness, not as a 
procedurally identified unity through adumbrative concatenations of consciousness 
outside of consciousness, but already as a unity as such of the simplicity of the absolute, 
10  See Husserl 1983, §§.38-46, esp. §44
11  Husserl 1983, 97
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as the perceiving as such, the appearing as such, the adumbrating as such. The manner 
in which the appearing as such appears to consciousness, i.e., the appearance of 
appearance, the perception of perceiving, and so forth, is that it is “absolutely” present 
with and within the movement of lived experience, as the movement as such. The being 
of the Ego who perceives that consciousness in its immanence is an “absolute actuality” 
completely free from any changeability or alterability of a “presumptive actuality” of the 
world of physical things which is exposed to a constant dubitability in the sense that a 
non-being is always part of its being on the horizon of possibility as conceivability.12 The 
pure consciousness as an immanent being is “indubitably absolute being in the sense 
that by essential necessity ‘nulla re indiget ad existendum.’ ” (ibid, 110)
consciousness considered in its “purity” must be held to be a self-contained complex of being, 
a complex of absolute being into which nothing can penetrate and out of which nothing can slip, 
to which nothing is spatiotemporally external and which cannot be within any spatiotemporally 
complex, which cannot be affected by any physical thing and cannot exercise causation upon any 
physical thing.( Husserl 1983, 112, original italics, bolds added)
Now what the absolute means in Husserl’s phenomenology has been clear: it means 
nothing but self-containedness as itself-givenness and self-sufficiency, namely, immanence 
as such, precisely in counter-position to the posited givenness, namely, transcendence. 
With that, a definite reversal of the meaning and function of being-relations takes place.13 
What had been traditionally considered as the first ground of confirmation, namely, the 
being of the real world, has become a “secondary” derivative sense in relation to the 
first absolute being of consciousness. 
4）Relational antinomy as a logic of placement
For Husserl, transcendence and immanence represents an absolute structure of 
the modality of being, having nothing to do with the finitude of human rationality 
or inadequacy of human perception. It is an eidetic law of presentation of objects on 
which the thing in itself [Gegenstand] takes. Insofar as the objects are physical things, 
for instance, they cannot but be given transcendently, of eidetic necessity, even to 
God.14 Not only immanence, but transcendence is also an absolutely determined being 
character of the being of physis. The first relation that the absoluteness determines is 
precisely the eidetic separation of the regions of objects; second, this essentially separate 
eideticity becomes an immediate basis for the determination of another relation, namely, 
constitutional hierarchy. Consciousness is absolute as “constituting being,” in the sense of 
the absolutely first source of the activation of all cognitive possibilities.
The meaning of the first here refers precisely to the first placement: the first is that 
12  ibid, §46.
13  ibid, §50.
14  ibid, §43.
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“which must already be there so that something real can manifest itself,” as Heidegger 
points out.15 The absolute, namely, the immanent consciousness, exists as having all 
those characters in its region, so that such region-characters themselves can be delved 
out, described, clarified, that is, scientifically thematized. Precisely this placedness in an 
absolute region constitutes the ontic style of phenomenological consciousness; the pure 
consciousness is ontically styled always as being placed, as being in the sphere of the 
absolute first. Being is made “seen” only as being placed in a certain sphere, as being 
represented by that sphere.
What all this shows is that the structural essence of the phenomenological being 
is a peculiar kind of relation: immanent consciousness is ontico-ontologically absolute, 
precisely because of its complete non-dependence in terms of constitution and its ultimate 
priority in the constitutive order, but always and of necessity “compared to any and 
every reality.”16 Likewise, the totality of the given, the reality is absolutely ontologically 
dependent on the horizon structure of possibility and the work of intentionality of 
rational consciousness on that horizon; it is always derivative, but that status of being-
derivative is absolute, also only and always in relation to the absolute being of the 
consciousness. In other words, the “inessentiality” of the being of the real shows itself as 
absolute. Physis is absolutely relative to consciousness, reality suffers from absolute non-
sufficiency essentially needing the other primary being in order for the being-meaning of 
its own to be verified.
Consequently, being qua relation is meant always as being placed in Husserl: by being 
placed in absoluteness, being as truth is to be discerned, precisely in relation to, vis-à-
vis non-being, namely, a mere sense of being.17 Moreover, by and with being placed in 
the absolute region, the absolute creates a place for the other—the non-absolute—, by 
saying in simultaneity that the unmixed exterior of purity is the place for the sake of 
giving a meaning to the Out; it endows the meaning of relativity to that other place, 
as also absolute. According to the antinomic relational formula of transcendence and 
immanence, the immanent and the transcendent, the ideal-irreal and the real, have to 
co-exist in such hierarchic administration of power: it is a legal code of what kind of 
communication is possible between the two modes of being, and how they can speak to 
each other in that possibility. 
5. The Moment of the Political in the Phenomenological Antinomy
Despite that the self-understanding of a motivational end of phenomenology is that 
phenomenology should aim to clarify and thematize the ultimately “disinterested 
15  Heidegger(1985), 105
16  Ibid.
17  Apparently, this sense of place finds its origin in Aristotle; in Aristotle, to be actualized is to be given a place 
in the order of beings. It also transparently revives in the Heideggerian motto that “language is a dwelling of 
being.” In Kant, too, the impossibility of talking about the pure transcendental subject as such is rendered to 
the problem of ‘How to designate a proper place for thought.’ Determination of being as a legal designation of 
a place is shaped with Husserl somewhat in the most ‘finished,’ most dramatic, and perhaps most ‘formidable’ 
fashion in this tradition of Western metaphysics.
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[uninterssierten/unbeteiligten]” essence of thēoria,18 Husserl’s phenomenology, from the 
very beginning launched itself as a clearly interest-laden project. In other words, the 
incipient motif that initiates the official move of phenomenology with the investigation 
into logic and has persisted from then on, is something that can be understood from 
the point of view of a strong interest. One most impending and long-lasting Husserlian 
phenomenological interest is a kind of geopolitical interest in a re-mapping of the rules 
of epistemology; a re-drawing of the constitutional diagram of truth in the form of a re-
shaping of the whole field system of science in the philosophical matrix is a consistent 
political interest that mobilizes Husserl’s phenomenology as a whole. 
By the political, in relation to the structure of the phenomenological being, we mean, 
first of all and above all, that which is concerned with placement in certain power-relation. 
We define as the political the structural character in which the relation between the 
placed beings is identified in a hierarchical power-relation, without the investment of 
which the placement itself does not occur, and which itself is an effect of the regional-
ontological demarcation. The key intent of that placement is, once again, relation. Giving 
places, designating places, shifting places, in the form of a bordering— all mean precisely a 
setup and an administration of certain definite political relation between those differentiae 
undergoing the placement. The specific object on which the placement is acted is being in 
Husserl’s case and the political of which we are catching sight indicates the character of 
an ontological relation between the regions determined according to the phenomenological 
rule of differentiation. On the other hand, the political is brought about with the 
phenomenological gesture to claim a legal right to decide the rule of the production and 
the management of the “legitimacy of the highest and ultimately necessary indubitability 
which leaves remaining no unasked and unsettled questions.”(Husserl 1974, 23) 
Now in the antinomic relational hierarchy between the two regions and kinds of 
being, the political specified in the meaning above works in such a way that the ideal, 
corresponding to the subjective-transcendental, metaphysically takes ‘care’ of the totality 
of the real; with the ‘care’, the ideal provides the absolute self-evident ground for any 
formal signification and in return, the totality of the natural-real acquires a legitimate 
meaning of its being. This care represents no other than the free transcendental play 
of subjective intentionality. With that relational-foundational structure of the intentional 
care, reason is neither a mere Cartesian natural light nor a Kantian legislator in 
Husserl, but an exclusively administrative and implementing political power as such 
which governs all epistemological relations in order to obtain ultimate security for the 
possibility of knowing. That power bespeaks itself precisely through the ontological 
antinomy between the real and the ideal. 
Ultimately, the overall structure of the antinomy places the ideal-normative in a 
dialectically oppositional relation to the real-factual. Within the relational structure, the 
18  In Husserl, a philosopher, a phenomenologist eventually, is described as a “disinterested—nonparticipant—
spectator” putting every worldly-thingly state of affairs to a universal question in a totally pure theoretical 
attitude, which means nothing but “doing a critique.” See Husserl (1970), 239 & “The Vienna Lecture” in ibid, 
285. 
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two antinomic modes of being constantly reaching each other by the founding-founded, 
transcendent-immanent needs. Yet, the manner of interdependency is precisely such 
that the transcendental-ideal relentlessly exercises its positional power from without 
onto the natural-real, to delimit the possibility for the latter to be as a justified being; 
within the unity, the discriminate position of the ideal being itself is decided up as an 
absolutely exclusive reference point to decide both the urgency of telos and the ultimacy 
of logos. In this manner, a kind of geopolitical structure is set into the antinomy of the 
phenomenological being, in which a specific epistemological-cultural power relation is 
formulated and set out to function, instituting a set of new ontological meaning-value. 
On the other hand, the phenomenological regional ontological antinomy as a logic 
of placement is attuned to the concept of politics of Rancièrian type, more or less. 
According to Rancière, politics arises with an ontological consciousness of the place; it is 
the logic of discordance over the proper boundary of the place due for the faction which 
feels itself deserved for that place.19 The Rancièrian place here indicates fundamentally 
a political place where the possibility of speech is reified20; being means exactly being 
placed in order to speak. Such Rancièrian conception of placement is particularly 
conditioned by the possibility of a constant change of the boundary of the “space where 
parties, or lack of parts have been defined.”21
The claiming of such place is a correlate to the “questioning” of the existing order of 
relationship.22 It does delegitimatize the existing order of beings and thereby reconfigures 
the relational structure, offering a new rule for the distribution of legitimacy. In this 
sense, Rancièrian concept of placement consumes the major geopolitical interest 
discovered in Husserl. But Husserlian placement has nothing to do with the “coming to 
existence of a place into phenomena” but has everything to do with a “going beyond 
the phenomena” to uncover the “concealed” place primordially reserved. In Husserl, 
it is not the case that a place for politics comes into existence, but that the political 
manifests itself with an ontological consciousness of the ideal place in eternal existence 
always already. In case of Husserl, the political is structurally internalized within the 
phenomenological transcendentality and the relational antinomy of being.
In this radical internality emerges a self-consciousness of the ideal part about its 
originarily exceptional placedness vis-à-vis the manner in which the real is placed. The 
original subjective consciousness of always already being placed, having to be placed, 
in such manner and mode, corresponds precisely to the consciousness of self-power as 
that which is “being always already there” incommensurably from and for the sake of 
the other forms of being.23 That the ideal power is absolutely validated by being placed 
at the ideal region preserving its full purity represents a phenomenological justice of 
19  Rancière (1999)
20  Ibid., Chapter 2.
21  Ibid, 30.
22  Ibid, 36. 
23  See especially Husserl (1970), Parts I-II and “The Vienna Lecture” in Ibid. 269-299. In addition, the notion of 
self-evidence in such sense is widely discussed in “The Origin of Geometry” in Ibid, 353-378.
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immanence as that which is demanded from the idea of science and theory as such.24 
The origin of all these political phenomena is precisely the ontological structural 
antinomy between the ideal and the real. In Husserlian framework, politics is present 
directly in the metaphysical flow of the legitimacy-founding power from the ideal to 
the real; the absolute antinomic ontological boundary serves the niche where any 
meaningful speech is allowed to begin and the essential theoretical substratum on which 
phenomenological talk is possible at all.
6．Conclusion: A Positive Antinomy 
It is Adorno who picked up the name antinomy first as a systemic fault of Husserl’s 
phenomenology.25 Sharp and brilliant as it is, his analysis is mainly focused on the 
Logical Investigations particularly on the antinomic mechanism of the categorical 
intuition in which the immediate wholeness of the pure presence of the universal Idea 
is ‘hypostatized’ into a particular perceptual event of tode-ti which is always already 
mediated by what is not itself.26 
But Husserlian antinomy, as I have translated it into an ontologico-teleological antinomy, 
rules over in fact the entire phase of Husserl’s phenomenology. For Husserl, the term 
“antinomy” can serve an index referring to the unique and most problematic Husserlian 
dialectic of inclusion and exclusion with which a specific epistemological power relation is 
positively formulated in such a way to establish a meaning hierarchy between theoreticity 
and normativity, between totality and infinity, between phenomena and essence, between 
part and whole, between meaning and origin, between subjectivity and objectivity, between 
crisis and critique, between antiquity and modernity, and at last between Europe and all 
the nonEuropean Rest. All those relations, phenomenologically captured as enigmatic, are 
in an inclusively-excluded, exclusively-including relational symbiosis throughout Husserl 
precisely and entirely grounded on the antinomy between the ideal and the real. It reveals 
us in the end a peculiar manner in which Husserl’s phenomenology places the universal-
ideal in the hierarchical power relation to the particular-real within the structure of the 
totality of all-encompassedness. As such, the Husserlian ontological-structural antinomy as 
a logic of placement performs a politics on the level of being.  
Such phenomenological antinomy no longer yields a Kantian situation that the rational 
dialectical striving for the ideal conflicts with the rational critical understanding of the 
real. Instead, the antinomic presence of the ideal itself is to be the essential condition 
for the possibility of knowing at all; understanding can complete its mission rather 
than being limited precisely thanks to the uncompromising ontological irreconcilability 
between the two modes and regions of being. The ontological oppositional relation to the 
otherness is inherent to the very being structure of the phenomenological reason.
The Husserlian antinomy is fundamentally positive-teleological rather than 
24  See Introduction of Husserl(1978),
25  Adorno (1982)
26  Ibid, 119-120 & 203-204
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negative-dialectical in Kantian function. The antinomy in Husserl is something that 
must preemptively exist for the sake of the unity of rationality, rather than being a 
consequential confrontation with it; it is precisely the incompatible state of the ideal 
being thanks to, and on the ground of which the route for the justification of the power 
of reason opens. In this sense, Husserlian antinomy does not appeal to the negative 
critical function as self-restriction and self-discipline of reason as in Kant, but stands 
for an absolute positivity which makes reason constantly affirm and reaffirm its infinite 
metaphysico-political power to construct meaning and decide legitimacy. 
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